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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE 
GROUP, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Case No. 920646-CA 
Priority 16 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final order pursuant to Rule 3 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Court of Appeals 
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), as 
amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court err in granting Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Groups ("Liberty") Motion for Summary Judgment and 
denying Allstate Insurance Company's ("Allstate") Cross-Motion 
for Summary Judgment? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Because summary judgment by definition does not 
resolve factual issues, a challenge to summary judgment presents 
for review only questions of law. [The Court reviews] those 
conclusions for correctness, according no particular deference to 
jr.jockey.apeIbref.joc 1 
the trial court." Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v, Dixie Power 
& Water, Inc.. 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case. 
This is a declaratory judgment action to determine 
coverage under two insurance policies, one issued by Liberty and 
one issued by Allstate. 
B. The Course Of Proceedings. 
On January 20, 1989, Allstate filed its Complaint. 
R. 2-6. The Complaint named Liberty and Travelers Insurance Co. 
Subsequently, Allstate voluntarily dismissed its claim against 
Travelers Insurance Co. R. 134-37. From January 20, 1989 to 
August 6, 1990, certain discovery was conducted. On August 6, 
1990, Liberty filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 31-32. 
Subsequently, Liberty and Allstate informally agreed to postpone 
further briefing of the motion so Allstate could conduct 
additional discovery. Further discovery was conducted and on 
June 7, 1991, Allstate filed its written opposition to Liberty's 
motion, a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and a motion to 
strike limited portions of two affidavits supporting Liberty's 
motion. R. 82-131. 
C. Disposition In The Court Below. 
On May 11, 1992, argument on the motions for summary 
judgment was heard by the Third District Court, the Honorable 
John A. Rokich presiding. R. 177. On June 18, 1992, the trial 
court entered an Order granting Liberty's Motion for Summary 
jr.jockey.apelbref.joc » 
Judgment, denying Allstate's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 
and granting Allstate's motion to strike. R. 182-84. Allstate 
appeals only the trial court's Order granting Liberty's motion 
and denying Allstate's cross-motion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 4, 1985, an automobile accident occurred 
involving two vehicles: a 1982 Buick Regal (the "Buick") driven 
by Lori Habish and another driven by Amie Przybyla. R. 3. Lori 
Habish did not own the Buick, but was driving it with her 
father's permission. R. 86. Amie Przybyla sustained serious 
injuries and sued Lori Habish and her father, Jack Habish 
("Habish"), in the Third District Court for recovery of her 
damages. Przybyla v. Lori Habish. et. al.. Civil No. C86 4893. 
R. 3. Allstate insured Habish and settled the claim for 
$100,000. R. 3-4. Allstate brought this action to recover the 
$100,000 from Liberty. R. 2-6. 
Jockey International, Inc. ("Jockey") employs several 
salespersons. To assist its salespersons in their employment, 
Jockey leases vehicles for their use. R. 42, 249, 581. Jockey 
leases the vehicles from Wheels, Inc. ("Wheels"). R. 42, 80, 
249. Jockey has been leasing vehicles from Wheels since at least 
November 24, 1971 pursuant to a written lease1. R. 80, 101-04. 
During the leasehold term, the vehicles were owned and titled in 
the name of Wheels. R. 42, 80. Jockey never acquired an 
]The lease was originally entered into between Wheels, Inc. 
and Jockey's predecessor, Cooper's, Inc. R. 495-96. 
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ownership interest in the vehicles. Id. In 1985, Liberty 
insured the vehicles leased by Jockey. R. 42. Liberty's policy 
covered the vehicles only during the term of the lease. Id. 
Allstate insured Wheels in 1985. R. 178, 249. 
The vehicles leased by Jockey vary in age and are 
replaced periodically at differing times. Since 1971, a practice 
has developed by which Jockey's employees may purchase from 
Wheels an old leased vehicle when a new replacement vehicle is 
provided. R. 42, 574, 583-84. A replacement vehicle is 
delivered to a local dealership and picked up by the respective 
Jockey employee. R. 252, 317. The replacement vehicle is used 
by Jockey's employee for Jockey's business. R. 252. If the 
employee does not intend to purchase the old leased vehicle, it 
is left at the local dealership for return to Wheels. R. 252, 
318, 537, 539, 611-12. If Jockey's employee intends to purchase 
the old leased vehicle, it is retained by the employee for his 
personal use. R. 252-53. 
Jockey employed Habish from approximately 1963 to 1986. 
R. 389-90. In October 1981, Wheels leased the Buick to Jockey. 
R. 80. Sometime prior to 1985, the Buick was delivered to 
Habish. R. 43, 390. From October 1981 to sometime after April 
4, 1985, Wheels owned legal title to the Buick. R. 42, 81. 
Jockey never acquired an ownership interest in the Buick. Id. 
In or before February 1985, Jockey notified Habish it 
would lease and provide him with a new vehicle to replace the 
Buick and Habish notified Jockey he wanted to purchase the Buick 
jr.jockey.apelbref.joc 4 
from Wheels. R. 400-02. On March 11, 1985, a 1985 Mercury 
Marquis (the "Mercury") was delivered to Habish for his use as a 
salesman for Jockey, to replace the Buick. R. 43, 81. Habish 
retained possession of the Buick, but did not use the Buick in 
his employment with Jockey after March 11, 1985. R. 447, 449-50. 
From March 11, 1985 to April 4, 1985, the Buick was used only for 
the Habish7s personal use. R. 414-16, 447, 449-50. At all times 
after March 11, 1985, Habish used only the Mercury in his 
employment with Jockey. R. 400-01, 447, 449-50. 
Paragraph 2 of the lease between Jockey and Wheels 
states in pertinent part: 
Lessee's Payments. Lessee agrees to pay to the Lessor, 
the full monthly rental for the month in which the 
vehicle is delivered if delivery is accomplished on or 
before the 15th day of the month, and in advance for 
each month for each motor vehicle delivered under the 
within lease. No billing will be made for the month of 
delivery in the event the vehicle is delivered after 
the 15th of that month. If the lease of a vehicle is 
terminated on or before the 15th of the month, no 
charge will be made for that month, however, if the 
lease of the vehicles is terminated after the 15th of 
the month, a full month will be billed for the month of 
termination. 
R. 101. Paragraph 12 states in pertinent part: "For billing 
purposes, the effective date of termination of a lease of a motor 
vehicle, shall be the delivery date of a replacement vehicle 
. . . ." R. 102. Thus, pursuant to those terms, the lease on 
the Buick terminated for billing purposes on March 11, 1985. 
Because the Mercury had been delivered on March 11, 1985, Wheels 
billed Jockey on the Mercury for the entire month of March and 
jr.jockey.apelbref.joc 5 
thereafter. R. 328, 602. Wheels did not require payment on the 
Buick after February 1985. R. 327-28, 598-601. 
The terms for the purchase of the Buick were 
established when the Mercury was delivered on March 11, 1985. On 
March 23, 1985, Habish obtained funds to purchase the Buick in 
full. R. 419. On about that same day, he tendered the funds to 
Wheels by mail to purchase the Buick. Id. After tendering the 
funds to Wheels, Habish believed the Buick was his own vehicle 
and understood he needed to obtain personal insurance coverage on 
the Buick. R. 414, 430, 447-48. Thus, on March 28, 1985, he 
obtained an oral binder of personal insurance coverage from 
Allstate on the Buick which became effective on March 29, 1985, 
six days before the accident. R. 140-41, 397-98. Wheels 
received Habish's funds on March 29, 1985. R. 81. At the time 
of the accident, Wheels and Habish were waiting for the new 
Certificate of Title to be issued. R. 3, 81. The new 
Certificate transferred legal title from Wheels to Habish, but 
only after the accident. R. 86. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This is a declaratory judgment action to determine 
insurance coverage between Liberty and Allstate. Based on the 
undisputed facts, the trial court concluded Liberty's insured did 
not possess an insurable interest in the Buick on the date of 
loss. Thus, the trial court determined Allstate was solely 
responsible to provide coverage, not Liberty. The trial court's 
decision was correct and should be affirmed. 
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To enforce an insurance contract, the named insured 
must possess an insurable interest when the policy is issued and 
when a loss occurs. Kingston v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 
578 P.2d 1278, 1279-80 (Utah 1978); American Mutual Fire 
Insurance Co. v. Passmore, 275 S.C. 618, 274 S.E.2d 416, 417 
(S.C. 1981). Jockey did not possess an insurable interest in the 
Buick on April 4, 1985, the date of the accident. Although 
Jockey previously possessed a leasehold interest, the lease 
terminated on March 11, 1985. Jockey never possessed legal 
title. Jockey never had physical possession of the Buick and 
relinquished legal control on March 11, 1985. Jockey had no 
potential legal liability to Amie Przybyla for Lori Habish's 
operation of the Buick. Thus, Liberty is not responsible for 
Przybyla's losses. 
Allstate's insureds, Wheels and Habish, possessed an 
insurable interest in the Buick on April 4, 1985. Wheels 
possessed legal title and Habish possessed equitable title. 
Habish had physical possession of the Buick. As the legal title 
holder, Wheels had legal control and Habish had physical control. 
Wheels gave Habish permission to use the Buick at his discretion. 
Habish gave Lori Habish permission to drive the Buick. Wheels 
and Habish possessed potential legal liability to Amie Przybyla 
for Lori Habish7s operation of the Buick. Thus, Allstate is 




JOCKEY DID NOT POSSESS AN INSURABLE INTEREST 
This is an action to determine the insurance coverage 
responsibilities between Allstate and Liberty. Allstate focuses 
solely on "ownership." Allstate argues its insured, Habish, did 
not possess "legal title" to the Buick, so it should not be 
responsible for the loss. Appellant's Brief, at 6-8. Allstate 
completely ignores that legal title was possessed by its other 
insured, Wheels. Allstate then argues Jockey has "ownership 
responsibilities" under its lease with Wheels and therefore 
Jockey's insurer, Liberty, must pay the loss. Id. at 8-15. 
"Ownership" is not the issue. 
To insure the Buick, Jockey had to possess an insurable 
interest in it. Kingston v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 578 
P.2d 1278, 1279-80 (Utah 1978); Hill v. Safeco Ins. Co., 22 Utah 
2d 96, 448 P.2d 915, 916 (1969). "[0]ne who has no interest in 
property cannot insure it." National Farmers Union Property and 
Casualty Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d 249, 252 (1955). 
Automobile liability insurance must also be supported by an 
insurable interest. American Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. 
Passmore, 275 S.C. 618, 274 S.E.2d 416, 417 (1981). See also, 
Bendall v. Home Indemnity Co., 286 Ala. 146, 150, 238 So.2d 177, 
180 (1970); 3 Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, § 24:160, at 
261 (2d ed. 1984). An insurable interest must exist when the 
insurance policy is issued and when a loss occurs. Kingston, 578 
jr.jockey.apelbref.joc Q 
P.2d at 1279. The Utah Supreme Court defined "insurable 
interest" in Hill; "'Generally speaking, a person has an 
insurable interest in property whenever he would profit by or 
gain some advantage by its continued existence and suffer some 
loss or disadvantage by its destruction. . . .,M 448 P.2d at 
916, n. 2 (quoting Couch on Insurance, 2d, Sec. 24.13 (Anderson 
1960)). The Utah Supreme Court has also defined what does not 
constitute an insurable interest. 
We agree that such an interest would not exist if it 
were based solely upon an agreement that an owner (such 
as Hardy) would permit another (such as Thompson) to 
insure the owner's (Hardy's) property for the benefit 
of the latter (Thompson) unless the latter had some 
interest in the property other than the right to 
recover if it were destroyed by fire. Such an 
agreement would permit one having no interest in the 
property except a potential gain from its destruction 
to gamble upon its loss and would be against public 
policy. It is unquestionably true that the party 
insuring must have some interest beyond this. 
Thompson. 286 P.2d at 252. The dispositive issue then is who had 
an insurable interest in the Buick on April 4, 1985. 
A. Jockey Did Not Possess A Leasehold Interest. 
Allstate's sole contention is that Wheels' lease 
imposed "ownership responsibilities" on Jockey which included the 
duty to insure the Buick. Appellant's Brief, at 8-10. Allstate 
admits Liberty has no liability if the lease terminated before 
the accident. Id. at 8-9. The pivotal issue then is when did 
the lease on the Buick terminate. Based on the undisputed facts, 
the trial court drew the legal conclusion that "the date that 
Jockey surrendered the vehicle to Habish for purchase from Wheels 
Inc. is the date the lease terminated." R. 179. Allstate is not 
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challenging any of the undisputed facts, only the trial court's 
legal conclusion.2 Allstate contends the trial court should 
have concluded the lease remained in effect until legal title 
passed from Wheels to Habish after April 4, 1985. Appellant's 
Brief, at 8-10. 
Allstate contends when the lease terminated is a legal 
question because the lease between Wheels and Jockey is 
unambiguous. Id. at 9. Liberty agrees the question of 
termination is one of law, but not only because the lease is 
unambiguous. Liberty agrees the lease is not ambiguous, but it 
does not define when termination occurs. While some of the 
lease's terms are helpful, the lease does not completely answer 
the question. 
The trial court's determination that the lease 
terminated when Jockey surrendered the Buick to Habish for 
purchase from Wheels is a legal conclusion. 
If a determination concerns whether the evidence 
showed that something occurred or existed, it is 
properly labeled a finding of fact, but if a 
determination is made by a process of legal reasoning 
from, or of interpretation of the legal significance 
of, the evidentiary facts, it is a conclusion of law. 
2
 In oral argument before the trial court, Allstate conceded 
"the only testimony that we're going to get in this case is 
already in the depositions." R. 265. Without specifying any 
factual disputes, Allstate also conceded thcit any alleged dispute 
would not preclude the trial court from deciding the legal issues 
in the case. R. 266-67. Allstate then declined the opportunity 
to have an evidentiary hearing and agreed to have the trial court 
resolve the matter based on the facts as stated by Liberty. R. 
266-68. In its appeal brief, Allstate has not challenged any of 
Liberty's facts. In fact, Allstate often relies on the statement 
of facts in Liberty's original memorandum in support of its 
motion for summary judgment. Appellant's Brief, at 2-3. 
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Moulden & Sons, Inc. v. Osaka Landscaping & Nursery, Inc.. 21 
Wash. App. 194, 584 P.2d 968, 970 n. 5 (1978)(citation omitted). 
The trial court,s determination was drawn from its interpretation 
of the legal significance of the undisputed evidentiary facts. 
Thus, it is a legal conclusion. When the material facts are 
undisputed, the determination of their legal effect is a question 
of law. See e.g., DeMontiney v. Desert Manor Convalescent 
Center, Inc., 144 Ariz. 21, 695 P.2d 270, 273-74 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1984)("While the question of whether an employment relationship 
is one of master and servant or principal and independent 
contractor is generally one of fact for the jury . . . where the 
evidence is clear and uncontradicted the question is one of law 
and should be decided by the court.11); United States Leasing 
Corp. v. duPont, 70 Cal. Rptr. 393, 444 P.2d 65, 75 (Cal. 
1968)("where, as here, the existence of liability depends upon 
the interpretation of written instruments in the light of 
uncontradicted extrinsic evidence, the question is properly one 
of law . . . . " ) ; Evans v. Bredow, 95 Ga. App. 488, 98 S.E.2d 
115, 117 (1957)("In view of the uncontradicted evidence the 
question of title became one of law for the court to 
determine."). Thus, this Court must determine if the legal 
conclusion drawn by the trial court from the undisputed facts was 
correct. 
Allstate contends the language of the lease requires a 
different conclusion by the trial court. Allstate relies on six 
paragraphs in the lease: ff 1, 4, 5, 11, 12 and 2. Id. at 9-10. 
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Paragraphs 1 and 4 give Jockey the right to possess a leased 
vehicle "during the term of the lease," but do not define the 
"term of the lease." Paragraphs 5 and 11 provide that Jockey 
will perform repairs and maintain liability insurance on a leased 
vehicle "during the term of the lease," but do not define the 
"term of the lease." Paragraph 12 provides that Jockey will 
return leased vehicles upon termination of the lease, but does 
not define when the lease terminates. Paragraph 12 also provides 
the lease terminates for billing purposes when a replacement 
vehicle is delivered, but does not specify when termination 
occurs for other purposes. Paragraph 2 outlines an 
administrative billing procedure, but does not define termination 
of the lease for all purposes. None of those paragraphs directly 
address this case. Nor do any other provisions in the lease. 
Allstate ignores the business practice which developed 
between Wheels and Jockey outside the lease. Periodically and at 
differing times, Jockey replaces the vehicles issued to its 
employees. A replacement vehicle is delivered to a local 
dealership and picked up by the respective Jockey employee. R. 
252, 317. The replacement vehicle is used by Jockey's employee 
for Jockey's business. R. 252. If the employee does not intend 
to purchase the old leased vehicle, it is left at the local 
dealership for Wheels. R. 252, 318, 537, 539, 611-12. If 
Jockey's employee intends to purchase the old leased vehicle, it 
is retained by the employee for his personal use. R. 252-53. 
The lease does not address that practice or Wheels' and Jockey's 
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respective insurance responsibilities between the time when the 
employee receives the replacement vehicle and assumes control of 
the replaced vehicle and when the purchase of the replaced 
vehicle is completed and legal title passes from Wheels to the 
employee. 
The trial court's conclusion is supported by the 
undisputed material facts. They are: The replacement vehicle, 
the Mercury, was delivered to and received by Habish on March 11, 
1985. R. 43, 81. After that date, Habish used only the Mercury 
for Jockey business. R. 400-01, 447, 449-50. After March 11, 
1985, Habish retained the Buick only for personal use. R. 414-
16, 447, 449-50. Habish considered the Buick his when he sent 
the purchase funds to Wheels on about March 23, 1985. R. 414. 
Prior to the accident, Habish understood he needed to obtain 
personal insurance coverage. R. 430, 447-48. Habish did not 
permit the Buick to be driven until after he had obtained 
personal insurance coverage. R. 397, 449-50. Habish obtained 
personal insurance coverage from Allstate which became effective 
on March 29, 1985, six days prior to the accident. R. 140-41, 
397-98. The lease on the Mercury began on March 11, 1985, when 
it was delivered to Habish, not when legal title to the Buick was 
transferred to Habish. 
The most enlightening indication of when the lease 
terminated is found in the billing treatment given by Wheels to 
the Buick. Pursuant to paragraph 12 of the lease, the lease on 
jr.jockey.apelbref.joc 13 
the Buick terminated for billing purposes on March 11, 19853. 
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of the lease, Wheels billed Jockey on the 
Mercury for the entire month of March and thereafter because the 
Mercury had been delivered on March 11, 1985. R. 328, 602. 
Wheels did not require any further lease payments on the Buick 
after February 28, 1985. R. 327-28, 598-601. If the lease had 
not terminated, Wheels would have required payment on the Buick 
from Jockey for March and April 1985. Because the lease 
terminated before the accident, Jockey's insurable leasehold 
interest in the Buick also expired. 
B. Jockey Did Not Possess Any other Insurable Interest. 
1. Jockey did not possess any ownership interest.—It 
is undisputed that Jockey did not possess any ownership interest 
in the Buick at any time. Jerold L. Mullane ("Mullane"), the 
Director of Corporate Risk Management/Insurance for Jockey, and 
Ford G. Pearson ("Pearson"), Executive Vice President of Wheels, 
testified that Jockey never acquired any ownership interest in 
any of the vehicles leased by Jockey from Wheels, including the 
Buick. R. 41-43, 79-81. Allstate admitted in its complaint, in 
oral argument and most recently, in its brief that Jockey did not 
own the Buick on April 4, 1985. R. 3, 263; Appellant's Brief, at 
2-3. 
3Allstate contends Liberty relies on paragraph 12 to 
establish the lease terminated on March 11, 1985 for all 
purposes. Appellant's Brief, at 11. Allstate uses 3 and 1/2 
pages quoting excerpts from Mullane's deposition to show that 
Liberty's alleged position is incorrect. Id. at 12-15. Liberty 
has never asserted that paragraph 12 controls termination for all 
purposes. That paragraph and the other undisputed facts, merely 
support the conclusion drawn by the trial court. 
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2. Jockey did not have possession or control.—It is 
undisputed that Jockey never had physical possession of the 
Buick. Jockey leased the Buick for Habish7s use, R. 80. The 
Buick was delivered to Habish. R. 43, 390. Habish used the 
Buick in his employment with Jockey, but retained physical 
possession at all times from October 1981 to at least April 4, 
1985. R. 383-489. 
Jockey had legal control over the Buick from 1981 to 
March 11, 1985, but relinquished control on that date. Jockey 
leased the Mercury to replace the Buick. R. 43, 81. On March 
11, 1985, the Mercury was delivered to Habish to be used in his 
employment. Id. Because of Habish7s expressed interest in 
purchasing the Buick, he retained physical possession of and 
assumed all control over it for his personal use. At that time, 
Jockey relinquished all control over the Buick. Habish was free 
to use the Buick as he pleased. R. 130-31. Lori Habish was 
driving the Buick on April 4, 1985 pursuant to her father's 
permission. R. 86. Jockey could not compel Habish to return it, 
limit his use of it or direct its disposition. 
3. Jockey had no risk of legal liability to third 
parties.—The insurable interest required to enforce an 
automobile liability policy is different than the interest 
required to enforce policies involving property loss. Bendall, 
238 So.2d at 180. Automobile liability policies protect the 
insured against legal liability for injuries to third parties 
caused by the ownership or use of the covered automobile. Id. at 
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181. Thus, the courts addressing this issue generally hold the 
existence of an insurable interest turns on whether the insured 
may be liable for damages sustained by third parties because of 
the automobile's use. See e.g., Passmore. 274 S.E.2d at 417-18; 
Rea v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 15 N.C. App. 620, 190 S.E.2d 
708, 713 (1972). One court characterized the requisite interest 
as whether "the 'assured' has such abiding interest in the use of 
the car in his business that he may become legally liable to 
others for injuries resulting from its operation . . . ." Id. 
(quoting Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v» Bear, 125 So. 676, 
679 (Ala. 1929). If not, there is no insurable interest. See 
e.g., Bendall, 238 So.2d 177; Employers Liability Assurance Corp. 
v. Swett. 95 N.H. 31, 57 A.2d 157 (1948); Passmore. 274 S.E.2d 
416. 
In determining an insured's potential liability, the 
courts have focused primarily on the named insured's control over 
or right to control the use of the automobile. See e.g.. 
Bendall. 238 So.2d 177; Swett. 57 A.2d 157; Passmore. 274 S.E.2d 
416. In Bendall, Swett and Passmore. the courts each held the 
named insured had to possess an insurable interest in an 
automobile liability policy. 238 So.2d at 180; 57 A.2d at 160; 
274 S.E.2d at 417. Each held or relied on prior case law that 
held the requisite insurable interest depends on the named 
insured's potential legal liability to third parties for damages 
sustained from the use of an automobile allegedly covered by the 
liability policy. 238 So.2d at 181; 57 A.2d at 160; 274 S.E.2d 
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at 417-18. Each found no potential legal liability because the 
named insured had no control over the use of the vehicle. 238 
So.2d at 179-82; 57 A.2d at 157, 159; 274 S.E.2d at 417-18. Each 
held no insurable interest existed. 238 So.2d at 181-82; 57 A.2d 
at 160; 274 S.E.2d at 418. 
Galati v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 381 S.W.2d 5, 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1964) is the closest case factually on point to 
this case. In Galati, Sam Galati leased a Chevrolet vehicle from 
Manchester Lend-Lease Co. Manchester retained legal title during 
the leasehold term. Id. at 6. The lease granted Galati an 
option to purchase the Chevrolet at any time. The lease required 
Galati to obtain collision coverage which he did. The policy 
named Galati and Manchester. A few months later, Galati's aunt, 
Mrs. Deblasi, expressed her interest in purchasing the Chevrolet 
from Manchester. Galati and Deblasi went to Manchester and told 
Manchester Deblasi was purchasing the vehicle. Id. Deblasi paid 
the purchase price in full, signed some documents and was told by 
Manchester she would eventually receive the certificate of title. 
Id. at 6-7. Then, Galati drove Deblasi home, gave her his only 
set of keys and Deblasi took possession of the Chevrolet. Id. at 
7. At that time, Galati considered the Chevrolet Deblasi's car. 
Two days later, Deblasi was involved in an accident. Deblasi 
received the certificate of title approximately two weeks later. 
Galati7s policy was never assigned to Deblasi. 
Galati sought to enforce the collision policy against 
his insurer. The lower court ruled in Galati's favor and the St. 
jr.jockey.apelbref.joc 17 
Louis Court of Appeals reversed. The court of appeals held an 
"insured must have an interest of some kind in the subject matter 
of the insurance. . . . [0]therwise the contract would become a 
gambling contract and void." Id. at 9 (citation omitted). The 
court further held that once "the insured parts with his interest 
in the insured property he stands as though he had never had any 
right in it, and from that moment forward his policy is void as a 
mere wagering contract." Id. The court found Galati had two 
interests under the lease: the right to possession and use of the 
car and the right to purchase it. The transfer of those rights 
was complete two days before the accident. Despite Manchester's 
failure to deliver the certificate of title before the accident, 
Deblasi had "acquired all the rights [Galati] had. There was no 
way thereafter that he could '* * * suffer a loss from its 
destruction. * * *'" Galati "was no longer '* * * exposed to the 
danger of the loss against which he was indemnified * * *.,n Id. 
Although Galati did not involve a liability policy, its 
facts would have also compelled the Missouri court to find no 
insurable interest in that context. Missouri follows the general 
rule that to enforce a liability policy the named insured must 
have an insurable interest. Hall v. Weston, 323 S.W.2d 673, 679-
80 (Mo. 1959). Missouri also follows the general rule that an 
insurable interest exists if the insured is legally liable to 
third parties injured because of the vehicle,s operation. 
Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 605 S.W.2d 125, 127 (Mo. 1980). 
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At the time of the accident, Manchester still possessed title to 
the Chevrolet. Deblasi had paid Manchester in full for the 
Chevrolet. Galati transferred possession of and control over the 
Chevrolet to Deblasi for her personal use. Galati considered it 
to be Deblasi7s. Galati had transferred and Deblasi had obtained 
"all the rights [Galati] had" before the accident. Galati would 
have had no legal liability to any third parties injured because 
of Deblasi7s operation of the Chevrolet. 
This case is factually identical to Galati. Wheels 
possessed legal title. R. 42, 81. Habish had paid Wheels in 
full for the Buick. R. 81, 419. Jockey transferred possession 
and all control to Habish before the accident for his personal 
use. Habish considered the Buick his and understood he needed 
personal insurance. R. 414, 430, 447-48. After March 11, 1985, 
not only did Habish not use the Buick in his employment, but also 
he did not permit its use for any purpose until he had obtained 
personal insurance coverage. R. 397, 449-50. Habish did not 
need Jockey's permission to use the car. In fact Jockey, did not 
have power to give or withhold permission. Rea, 190 S.E.2d at 
713. Lori Habish was operating the Buick for her personal use 
and by her father's permission. R. 86. Thus, Jockey had no 
legal liability to Przybyla and therefore no insurable interest 
in the liability policy. 
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POINT II 
WHEELS AND HABISH HAD AN INSURABLE INTEREST 
A. Allstate's Insureds Had An Ownership Interest, 
It is undisputed that Allstate's insured, Wheels, 
possessed legal title to the Buick at all times before and on 
April 4, 1985. Mullane and Pearson testified Wheels possessed 
legal title to the Buick before and on April 4, 1985. R. 41-43, 
79-81. Allstate has never disputed that testimony. In fact, 
Allstate admits in its Statement of Facts that Wheels possessed 
legal title until sometime after April 4, 1985. Appellant's 
Brief, at 2-3. 
Although Allstate7s other insured, Habish, did not 
obtain legal title until after the accident, he possessed 
equitable title to the Buick on April 4, 1985. In February 1985, 
Habish expressed his desire to purchase the Buick. R. 400-02. 
By approximately March 23, 1985, Habish acquired and sent to 
Wheels the funds to purchase the Buick. R. 419. Wheels received 
the funds by March 29, 1985. R. 81. By April 4, 1985, Habish 
had completed all the terms of the purchase and Wheels and Habish 
were merely waiting for Utah to issue a new certificate of title. 
R. 3, 81, 86. Thus, equitable title had passed to Habish. 
The transfer of equitable title despite the failure to 
effectuate the transfer of a new certificate of title was 
recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in Dahl v. Prince, 119 Utah 
556, 230 P.2d 328 (1951). In Dahl, a Buick was registered in the 
name of Garn. Id. at 329. The Gams purchased a truck from Dahl 
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and traded the Buick to Dahl as part payment for the truck. Dahl 
did not obtain a new certificate of title. Subsequently, the 
Gams7 creditor, C. G. Green, obtained a writ of attachment and 
had the writ levied on the Buick. Green argued he was entitled 
to the Buick because Dahl had not effected transfer of title. 
Id. Green relied on Utah Code Ann. § 57-3a-72 (1943)4. Id. at 
330. The Utah Supreme Court stated section 57-3a-72 governed the 
transfer of legal title only and not equitable title. The Court 
further stated the statute implied equitable title transferred to 
a bona fide purchaser. Id. The Court held the purchase between 
the Garns and Dahl was complete and equitable title had passed. 
Id. at 330-31. The transfer of equitable title has been 
recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in other cases. See Hall v. 
Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983)("In a uniform real estate 
contract . . . the vendor usually retains legal title and passes 
equitable title to the purchaser." Id. at 227); First Security 
Bank of Utah, N. A. v. Hall, 29 Utah 2d 24, 504 P.2d 995 
(1972)(The recipient of a stock gift obtains equitable title 
notwithstanding the donor's failure to endorse the stock 
certificates. Id. at 996); Mosbv Irrigation Co. v. Criddle, 11 
Utah 2d 41, 354 P.2d 848 (1960)(Notice to the owner of equitable 
title to application for appropriation of water was proper. Id. 
at 851-52). 
4Section 57-3a-72 is the predecessor to section 41-1-72. 
Allstate relies on section 41-1-72. 
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B. Allstate's Insureds Had Possession And Control. 
It is undisputed that Habish physically possessed the 
Buick from 1981 to at least April 4, 1985. It cannot be disputed 
that Habish exercised control over the Buick from March 11, 1985 
to April 4, 1985. Habish retained possession of the Buick after 
March 11, 1985 for his personal use. He drove only the Mercury 
for his employment. He did not permit anyone to drive the Buick 
until he had obtained personal insurance coverage. Once insured 
on March 29, 1985, Habish gave permission to his daughter to 
drive the Buick. Habish had a right to direct the Buick's 
disposition. Furthermore, it cannot be disputed that Wheels had 
some right to control the Buick from March 11, 1985 to April 4, 
1985. Transfer of legal title had not been completed. If Habish 
had failed to meet any of the terms of the purchase, Wheels would 
have been entitled to demand return of the Buick. 
C Only Allstate's Insureds Had An Insurable Interest. 
Based on Hill's definition of an "'insurable interest," 
only Habish and Wheels had an insurable interest on April 4, 
1985. Jockey's interest in the Buick ceased on March 11, 1985. 
Wheels delivered the Mercury to Habish as a replacement for the 
Buick. Habish retained possession of the Buick for his personal 
use. The Buick was no longer available to Jockey for its use or 
the use of its employees. Habish's responsibilities to Jockey 
were no longer dependent on his use of the Buick. Habish 
possessed the Mercury to perform his job responsibilities. 
Jockey no longer controlled the Buick's disposition. Jockey 
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could not profit by or gain any advantage by the Buick's 
continued existence. Jockey could not suffer any loss or 
disadvantage by its destruction. If the Buick had been stolen, 
damaged or destroyed, Jockey's business interests would not have 
been affected. Jockey could not have claimed a taxable loss or 
recover any insurance proceeds. 
Wheels and Habish, however, stood to gain from the 
vehicle's continued existence and risked a loss by its 
destruction. "'Any interest in property, legal or equitable, 
qualified, conditional, contingent, or absolute, or merely the 
right to use the property, with or without the payment of rent, 
is sufficient.'" Hill, 448 P.2d at 916, n. 2 (emphasis added). 
Other courts have held equitable title is a sufficient insurable 
interest. See e.g., Cherry v. Cherry, 343 P.2d 1066, 1068 (Okla. 
1959) ; Snodcrrass v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.. 
15 Kan. App. 2d 153, 804 P.2d 1012, 1017-18 (1991). The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court stated: 
'As soon as any interest in property vests in the 
vendee, he has an insurable interest therein, as in the 
case of a vendee under an executory contract of 
purchase which operates to vest in him an equitable 
title to the property. . . . It is not material that 
the legal title to the property has not passed to the 
vendee, who has paid part of the purchase price; and 
the insurable interest of the vendee is not defeated by 
the fact that the contract of purchase is unenforceable 
under the statute of frauds, * * * The destruction of 
property is a real loss to the person in possession, 
who claims title under an executory contract of 
purchase, and neither the fact that he owes the 
purchase money nor the contingency that his title may 
be defeated by his inability subsequently to perform 
the conditions of his contract defeats the existence of 
an insurable interest in him. * * *' 
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Cherry, 343 P.2d at 1069 (citation omitted). Habish had 
equitable title and his insurer was responsible. Because Wheels' 
legal title had not transferred to Habish, Wheels' insurer was 
responsible for the loss too. State Farm Mutual Insurance 
Company v. Holt. 28 Utah 2d 426, 503 P.2d 1205 (1972). In 
addition, to the extent Habish defaulted on the purchase, Wheels 
also controlled disposition of the vehicle. Wheels had an 
interest in preserving the Buick's value until legal title was 
transferred in case it had to retrieve the vehicle. 
Finally, Wheels and Habish were exposed to legal 
liability to Przybyla. Because Wheels owned legal title, Habish 
was using the Buick pursuant to Wheels' permission. Only the 
legal title holder or someone with the right to possess and 
control the vehicle can give permission. Rea, 190 S.E.2d at 713. 
Habish controlled the use of the Buick and gave Lori Habish 
permission to use it for her personal use. Both then faced 
potential legal liability for Lori Habish's operation of the 
vehicle. Allstate covered both. Only Allstate was responsible 
for Przybyla's damages. 
POINT III 
HABISH CANNOT NOT ENFORCE WHEELS' LEASE AGAINST JOCKEY 
Assuming arguendo the lease between Wheels and Jockey 
did not terminate before the accident, it cannot serve as a basis 
for compelling enforcement of Liberty's policy. Allstate's sole 
argument is that Jockey had a contractual obligation to insure 
the Buick until legal title passed to Habish. Appellant's Brief, 
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at 8-10. That alleged contractual obligation arises from the 
lease. Habish is not a party to the lease. Wheels is not a 
party to the action. There is no claim or evidence that Wheels7 
rights under the lease were assigned to Habish. Any contractual 
obligation to insure the Buick was owed to Wheels and Habish has 
no standing to enforce it. 
POINT IV 
ALLSTATE'S RELIANCE ON HOLT IS MISPLACED 
Allstate's reliance on State Farm Mutual Insurance 
Company v. Holt. 28 Utah 2d 426, 503 P.2d 1205 (1972) is 
misplaced. In Holt, Yazzie was purchasing a vehicle from his 
employer who possessed legal title to the vehicle. Yazzie7s 
employer, Holt, retained legal title to the vehicle pending full 
payment by Yazzie. Before full payment was made and, therefore, 
before legal title was transferred from Holt to Yazzie, the 
vehicle was involved in an accident. The Supreme Court held that 
because Holt possessed an insurable interest at the time of the 
accident, as the legal title holder, Holt's insurer was liable. 
Holt does not require Liberty to pay. At all times 
prior to the accident, Wheels possessed legal title to the Buick. 
Prior to the accident, Habish had paid Wheels in full to purchase 
the Buick and was waiting to have legal title transferred from 
Wheels to Habish. On the date of the accident, legal title 
remained in Wheels and Habish possessed equitable title. Thus, 
Holt requires Allstate to pay as either Wheels7 insurer or 
Habish's insurer, but not Liberty. 
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POINT V 
UTAH LAW DID NOT REQUIRE JOCKEY TO INSURE THE BUICK 
Allstate contends that Utah law required Jockey to 
insure the Buick until legal title transferred. Appellant's 
Brief, at 10-11. Allstate further contends it is illegal for 
Jockey to operate the Buick without liability insurance. Id. 
From March 11, 1985 to April 4, 1985, Jockey was not operating 
the Buick. The Buick was controlled by Habish and operated by 
Habish or his daughter only for their personal use and only after 
he had obtained personal liaility coverage from Allstate on March 
29, 1985. Any duty to insure arising out of ownership in the 
Buick belongs to either Wheels as the legal title owner or Habish 
as the equitable owner, but not Jockey. 
CONCLUSION 
Absent an insurable interest in the Buick, Jockey 
cannot insure it. Although Jockey previously possessed an 
insurable interest, Jockey relinquished any interest it had on 
March 11, 1985. Thus, on April 4, 1985, the date of the 
accident, Jockey did not possess any insurable interest in the 
Buick. However, Allstate's insureds, Wheels and Habish, did. 
The trial court's Order granting Liberty's motion for summary 
judgment and denying Allstate relief was correct. Thus, Liberty 
requests that this Court affirm the trial court's decision. 
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DATED: December / 1992. 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
0 1 ^ 
lansen 
'Jef fre^^obinson 
Attorneys for Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Group 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE 




CIVIL NO. 890900412 
The Court heard the Summary Judgment Motion of defendant 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Group and plaintiff's cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment on May 11, 1992. The Court heard oral 
argument and read the Memoranda filed herein. The Court now 
enters its ruling. 
The undisputed facts are: 
1. Allstate was Wheels Inc. insurer. 
2. Wheels Inc. was the titled owner of the Buick 
automobile leased to Jockey. 
3. Jockey's employees used the leased vehicles. 
4. Jack Habish was an employee of Jockey. 
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5. Mr. Habish made arrangements to purchase the Buick 
automobile furnished to him by Jockey from Wheels Inc., the 
title holder. 
6. Jockey surrendered the Buick to Mr. Habish so that he 
could purchase the Buick from Wheels Inc. 
7. Habish negotiated the purchase of the Buick from 
Wheels Inc. and caused the vehicle to be covered by his 
insurance policy. 
8. Prior to the time that Wheels Inc. caused title to be 
transferred to Habish, Habish's daughter, while driving the 
vehicle, was involved in an accident. 
9. As a result of the accident, Allstate satisfied a 
claim against Habish's daughter for $100,000.00. 
10. Jockey, as a lessee, maintained insurance coverage on 
the vehicles leased from Wheels Inc. 
The issue presented to the Court was whether or not the 
Buick was covered by Jockey's insurance carrier, Liberty, until 
such time as title was transferred to Habish. 
The Court concluded that the date that Jockey surrendered 
the vehicle to Habish for purchase from Wheels Inc. is the date 
the lease terminated. When Wheels Inc. agreed to sell the 
vehicle to Habish, which was before the date of the accident, 
Wheels Inc. and Habish were responsible for insurance coverage 
on the Buick. 
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The critical issue in this case is the date of surrender of 
the Buick for sale and not the transfer of title. Jockey was 
required to maintain insurance only for so long as it had a 
leasehold interest in the vehicle. Once Jockey gave up the 
leasehold interest by surrendering the Buick for sale by the 
lessor, its obligation for insurance coverage terminated. 
Transfer of title effected only the relationship between Habish 
and Wheels, Inc. 
Plaintiff's Motion to partially strike the Affidavits of 
Jerald L. Mullane and Ford G. Pearson is granted. 
The Motion of defendant Liberty Mutual Insurance Group for 
Summary Judgment is granted and plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is denied. 
Dated this 2> 6 day of May, 1992. 
\ JOHN A. ROKICH 
'-©ISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
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of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE 




Civil No. C-89-0900412 
Judge John A. Rokich 
Oral argument was heard on Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Group's Motion for Summary Judgment and Allstate Insurance 
Company's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and motion to 
partially strike the Affidavits of Jerold L. Mullane and Ford G, 
Pearson. After oral argument, the Court took the matter under 
advisement. On May 26, 1992, the Court issued a Memorandum 
Decision. Based on the parties' oral argument, the legal 
memoranda, the record on file, the Court's Memorandum Decision, 
and good cause appearing therefore, 
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IT IS ORDERED that: 
1. Liberty Mutual Insurance Group's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted and plaintiff's Complaint against 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Group is dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Allstate Insurance Company's Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment is denied. 
3. Allstate Insurance Company's motion to partially 
strike the Affidavits of Jerold L. Mullane and Ford G. Pearson is 
granted. 
DATED: June /§ , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
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